
















This paper analyzes current stresses in the two key areas that concerned the architects of 
the original Bretton Woods system: international liquidity and exchange rate 
management. Despite radical changes since World War II in the market context for 
liquidity and exchange rate concerns, they remain central to discussions of international 
macroeconomic policy coordination.  To take two prominent examples of specific (and 
related) coordination problems, liquidity issues are paramount in strategies of national 
self-insurance through foreign reserve accumulation, while recent attempts by emerging 
market economies (EMEs) to limit real currency appreciation have relied heavily on 
nominal exchange rate management. A central message is that a diverse set of potential 
asymmetries among sovereign member states provides fertile ground for a variety of 
coordination failures. The paper goes on to discuss institutions and policies that might 
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The global economic crisis of 2007-09 generated calls to re-think the international 
monetary system, and indeed, the entire institutional framework within which 
international financial integration has advanced since the fall of the Bretton Woods 
regime four decades ago.  Gaps in national and international structures of financial 
regulation were an obvious factor in causing the most severe global crisis since the Great 
Depression; another chapter of this book addresses that topic. Interactions between 
national macroeconomic policies also played a role, however, and have continued to 
generate rancor between countries as a geographically uneven recovery from the crisis 
has unfolded. The crisis and its aftermath exposed stresses in the world’s monetary 
system, stresses that continue to be felt.
1 
  This chapter analyzes current stresses in the two critical areas that concerned 
the architects of the original Bretton Woods system: international liquidity and exchange 
rate management.
2 Despite radical changes since World War II in the market context for 
liquidity and exchange rate concerns, they remain central to discussions of international 
macroeconomic policy coordination.  To take two prominent examples of specific (and 
related) coordination problems, liquidity issues are paramount in strategies of national 
self-insurance through foreign reserve accumulation, while recent attempts by emerging 
market economies (EMEs) to limit real currency appreciation have relied heavily on 
nominal exchange rate management. A key message – an obvious point, but one that 
nonetheless is a basic starting place for predicting a range of tensions in any system of 
                                                 
1 The crisis brought home vividly the strong two-way interaction between macroeconomic policies and 
financial-sector stability, demonstrating the adverse consequences of viewing macro and prudential policy 
as somehow orthogonal to each other. While my discussion thus will focus on macroeconomic policies, I 
will inevitably touch upon financial-stability considerations at several points. 
2 In the present context, the relevant concept of “liquidity” is funding liquidity, in the sense of 
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009). For illuminating discussions of international coordination problems as 
seen from the perspective of the IMF’s founding, look at Metzler, Triffin, and Haberler (1947).   2
international monetary arrangements – is that a diverse set of potential asymmetries 
among sovereign member states provides fertile ground for a variety of coordination 
failures.  
Despite the progress of technology, financial innovation, globalization, and 
development, sharp international asymmetries remain and so coordination failures with 
recognizable analogs in earlier historical eras have emerged. Earlier efforts at 
international monetary reform attempted to reconcile individual nations’ demands for 
domestic economic stability with a smooth international adjustment mechanism. Those 
attempts had limited success and even the most ambitious and successful of them – the 
Bretton Woods system – crumbled after a quarter century under the weight of its internal 
contradictions. The recent global crisis has highlighted once again the twenty-first 
century incarnations of a range of time-honored systemic strains. Some of the problems 
have become more severe, or problematic in new ways. The resulting pressures on 
international economic relations define the current reform agenda.  
The plan of this chapter is as follows. Section I sets out some dilemmas, old and 
new, relating to the supply of international liquidity in settings where the demand for safe 
foreign exchange reserves grows faster than the supply over the long term. The 
discussion emphasizes the fiscal dimension of such “Triffin dilemmas.” Section II 
describes how financial globalization has increased countries’ needs for international 
liquidity, and sketches a structure for liquidity provision that would avoid negative 
externalities inherent in self-insurance through large-scale reserve accumulation. 
Section III turns to exchange rates and global imbalances, with emphasis on modern 
versions of older coordination problems. Section IV concludes.   3
 
I. International Liquidity and Triffin Dilemmas 
 
Like households and firms, governments need access to liquidity – readily salable assets 
(including cash, of course) that may be spent on goods or (particularly in crisis situations) 
on other assets. In a closed economy, the government (through its central bank) is always 
capable, in principle, of providing for all liquidity needs. In the open economy this is no 
longer the case. When the need is for a foreign currency, which the central bank cannot 
print, gross holdings (reserves) and available foreign-currency credits constrain the 
government’s powers, whether to provide liquidity to markets (as in a foreign exchange 
intervention) or directly to market actors (as in an emergency loan to a bank).  
  Throughout history, international reserves have been an important source of 
liquidity. What properties characterize an attractive international reserve asset? In the 
broadest terms, the asset should be widely acceptable as payment at a predictable value, 
even when liquidated without notice. But in what numeraire should value be measured? 
Merely asking the question reveals that “predictability of value” cannot be an absolute 
norm, unless the numeraire is a particular money – such as the international vehicle 
currency, which the American dollar overwhelmingly remains – or a particular 
commodity such as gold. In a world of significant departures from purchasing power 
parity, maintenance of real value (in terms of a comprehensive consumption basket) 
necessarily depends on the beholder. In a global economy, however, it may be more 
relevant to refer to “liquidities” than “liquidity.” If several currencies are widely used 
internationally as medium of exchange and/or unit of account, then it may well be   4
desirable for a country to hold liquidity in all of those currencies, regardless of moderate 
changes in their relative values – a theme I explore further below. 
Changes in value, moreover, can arise in different ways (again depending on the 
numeraire against which value is reckoned). Exchange rate and inflation risk are obvious 
possibilities, but so are default risk, sovereign or private, and political risk. Foreign-
currency U.S. bonds issued by the Carter Administration inherited the minimal (at the 
time) default risk of conventional dollar-denominated Treasury obligations. On the other 
hand, liquid dollar liabilities of London eurobanks (typically counted in reserve measures 
if owned by monetary authorities) carry counterparty risk (absent an official bailout) but 
not currency risk vis-à-vis the dollar. Again, safety is in the eye of the beholder. 
Countries experiencing or contemplating political tensions with the U.S. – think of cases 
involving Iran, Iraq, Russia, Libya, or Syria – might prefer the counterparty risk intrinsic 
to a lightly regulated offshore center to the risk of a retaliatory freeze on assets held in the 
United States.
3 
  In the early post-World War II economy, with global capital markets dormant 
and much of the industrial world in ruins, the main forms of international liquidity were 
gross holdings of gold and U.S. dollars (and, to a lesser extent, sterling). Eichengreen 
(2011) paints a vivid picture of this period of virtually unrivaled dollar dominance as a 
reserve asset in the 1950s. That dominance persisted through the demise of the Bretton 
Woods system in the early 1970s (and indeed far beyond), but not without increasing 
tensions.  
                                                 
3 The possibility of holding dollar reserves in banks outside the U.S. shows that it is not necessarily correct 
to assert that U.S. balance of payments deficits govern the growth rate of world dollar reserves. Of course, 
liquidation of such offshore reserves by the non-U.S. holder will ultimately have the same effect on the 
U.S. balance of payments as if the reserve assets liquidated were themselves held in the U.S.    5
Those tensions arose from one of a class of problems to which any reserve-asset 
system is potentially susceptible: what may be called a Triffin dilemma. A Triffin 
dilemma arises any time increasing demand for a reserve asset strains the ability of the 
issuer to supply sufficient amounts while still credibly guaranteeing or stabilizing the 
asset’s value in terms of an acceptable numeraire. 
 
The Classic Triffin Dilemma: It’s Mostly Fiscal   
 
Under the Bretton Woods arrangements, countries pegged their currencies to the U.S. 
dollar, while the U.S. Treasury continued a longstanding commitment (dating from 
January 31, 1934) to redeem dollars held by non-U.S. central banks and governments for 
gold “for legitimate monetary purposes” at a price of $35 per ounce.
4 While the Treasury 
guarantee of the dollar gold link reassured foreign official dollar holders that their 
reserves were “as good as gold,” it also led to at least two potential inconsistencies.  
The first inconsistency was familiar from the classical gold standard. If world 
output growth outpaced world gold production, the relative price of gold would likely 
have to rise, implying secular deflation assuming a fixed market gold price of $35 per 
ounce. Countries outside the U.S. could maintain their internal price levels by devaluing 
against the dollar, but the U.S. itself did not have this option. For a time in the 1950s and 
1960s, various fortuitous developments held off the deflationary threat; for example, the 
development of new South African mining capacity, along with Russian gold sales 
                                                 
4 This commitment followed from the Gold Reserve Act of January 30, 1934 (Yeager 1976, p. 352). The 
Act also gave licensed users in industry and the arts the right to buy gold at the official price. (The Treasury 
added a ¼ percent transaction fee to the official price, and applied an identical discount to its gold 
purchases.)   6
(which ended in 1966). Eventually, though, the conundrum was resolved in March 1968 
through the two-tier gold market, which allowed the nonofficial gold price to float. It was 
then that the U.S. currency, and currencies pegged to it, became fiat monies.
5 
  The second inconsistency persisted even after the start of the two-tier market. 
The official tier (by design) left intact the U.S. obligation to redeem foreign dollar 
reserves for gold at the old official price. Once again, however, world output growth, and 
the concomitant growth in world dollar reserves, seemed likely to outpace world gold 
production. Were the U.S. Treasury to maintain a $35 buying price for an ounce of gold, 
therefore, U.S. monetary gold stocks could not possibly increase. As famously observed 
by Triffin (1960), the United States eventually would not have enough gold to redeem all 
the official dollar reserves at par, even if it used up the entirety of its holdings. The 
reserve currency issuer would become vulnerable to a run by central banks. The problem 
might have bee manageable had countries not expected their own currencies to appreciate 
against the dollar – it may be easier for a central bank to forgo a gain than to take a loss – 
but by the late 1960s the feeling was growing that the dollar would need to be realigned 
downward, as eventually happened in the August 1971 Smithsonian accord. 
  Figure 1 illustrates the trends. In 1948, the United States held most of the 
world’s gold reserves. Through 1960, U.S. gold stocks shrank but remained above the 
growing stock of dollar foreign reserves. And then the lines cross, seemingly making the 
U.S. vulnerable to a Triffinesque run. (That event was marked by speculation in the 
                                                 
5 This stratagem did not, by itself, resolve the (more serious) problem that the dollar itself could be 
devalued only through a concerted revaluation of foreign currencies (as occurred in August 1971, when the 
U.S. coincidentally suspended gold sales to foreign monetary authorities). One solution suggested for the 
Triffin problem before the gold window was closed was to raise the official dollar price of gold. Apart from 
other drawbacks, a gold-price change would not automatically have devalued the dollar against other 
currencies.   7
London gold market, causing the formation of the gold pool; see Eichengreen 2011.) The 
preceding trends continue as world monetary gold stocks fail to keep pace with growing 
global foreign exchange reserves. Figure 2 shows that in 1966 – the year that Russian 
gold sales ceased (Cooper 1969, p. 580) – world gold production leveled off. In 
retrospect, the abandonment of the single-tier gold market soon thereafter is not 
surprising. World dollar reserves began a steep upward ascent in 1970 as heavy 
speculation against the dollar set in. To defend the dollar parities of stronger currencies 
such as the deutsche mark and Swiss franc, the issuing central banks undertook massive 
dollar purchases. Global dollar reserves exploded  – without reducing U.S. reserves, 
absent gold redemptions. 
  On the surface, Triffin’s point seems obvious. But deeper reflection suggests 
that the classic form of the Triffin dilemma was really a fiscal problem. After all, why 
couldn’t the U.S. government have purchased more gold on the market, if need be, to pay 
off foreign central banks? And what strain on the U.S. fiscal position would have 
resulted?  
  At the end of 1970, the year before U.S. President Richard Nixon suspended 
official gold convertibility (August 1971), U.S. gold reserves stood at $11 billion dollars, 
while world nongold reserves outside the U.S. stood at  $53 billion, leaving the U.S. with 
$42 billion in potential official claims that it could not cover with its existing gold 
holdings. The sum of $42 billion, however, amounted to 4.2 percent of that year’s GDP, 
at a time when the gross U.S. federal debt stood at 28 percent of GDP – a large, but not 
insuperable, fiscal cost (especially by today’s standards).   8
  The preceding calculation, however, assumes that the Treasury could have 
purchased the gold it needed in the world market at $35 per ounce. But this is surely not 
the case. World gold production in 1970 (at the $35 price) amounted to $1.8 billion, 
whereas total world monetary gold stocks outside the U.S. were $29 billion. The sum of 
the new flow and the existing stock, roughly $31 billion, falls far short of what the U.S. 
needed to cover its total $53 billion obligation (an obligation that exploded in the 
succeeding years). Even if the U.S. Treasury had been able to purchase all the world’s 
monetary gold and all current production without bidding up the world price – an 
impossibility – it still would have been $11 billion short. It is clearly unlikely that the 
Treasury would have been able to buy all the necessary gold at any finite price. Any 
Treasury attempt to buy gold in private markets on any substantial scale would likely 
have resulted in a gold price so high as to make the resulting fiscal burden unbearable. 
  This potential fiscal insolvency was the key danger inherent in the Triffin 
problem. As Figure 1 shows, of course, the problem became even worse after 1970 as 
speculative switches out of dollars into foreign currencies accelerated, and as even some 
central banks exchanged dollars for U.S. gold. The result was the Nixon-Connally policy 
package of August 1971, leading directly to the Smithsonian realignments in December 
1971. 
  
The Modern Triffin Dilemma 
 
After the industrial countries moved to flexible exchange rates in 1973, world reserve 
growth, surprisingly at the time, continued. Global nongold reserves have expanded (in   9
nominal dollar terms) in all but three of the years after 1971. Starting in 2002, and 
powered by the demand and growth of emerging economies, global reserves have grown 
at double digit rates in every year but one (2008, when the yearly growth rate was 9.7 
percent). But between 1972 and 1980, global reserves likewise grew at double-digit rates 
in all but one year. Motivations for this continuing global demand for international 
liquidity have been widely discussed in the academic literature. As I take up in the next 
section, one can make a strong case that the evolution of world capital markets over 
recent decades has made the potential need for swift and perhaps massive key currency 
liquidity support – whether from reserves or some other source – much more pressing 
today than it was even in the days of generalized fixed exchange rates. 
  Nor has the basic Triffin paradox disappeared. The emergence of a modern 
species of Triffin dilemma has been diagnosed most clearly by Farhi, Gourinchas, and 
Rey (2011). It is a subtler problem than the Bretton Woods version, because there is no 
longer a reserve-center promise to redeem liabilities at a fixed price in terms of some 
scarce numeraire. It is a Triffin problem nonetheless because the underlying asymmetric 
dynamics of global growth guarantee that eventually, the reserve system will become 
unsustainable. Moreover, the problem remains even in a multipolar world with several 
reserve currencies.
6 
The problem is not simply that, under floating exchange rates, reserves are subject 
to depreciation risk: reserve holders have proved willing to tolerate exchange-rate 
fluctuations, provided there is not a continuing trend of sudden depreciations. Thus, for 
example, foreign accumulation of dollar reserve claims on the U.S. does not inherently 
                                                 
6 The general problem had already been discerned by some policymakers in connection with the 
internationalization of the deutsche mark and yen (see Henning 1994, p. 317). 
   10
require large U.S. current account deficits, which might predict significant future dollar 
devaluation. Dollar reserve growth may be primarily a result of gross capital outflows 
from the U.S., as was true during the mid-1960s (when the U.S. had a sizable trade 
surplus with trading partners and was still a net foreign creditor).  
  The modern-day Triffin problem resides instead in the nature of the securities 
central banks hold as reserves. A key feature of a reserve asset is that it is liquid and 
predictable in value. True, exchange rate fluctuations are not predictable – but for a 
country experiencing a localized crisis, any movement of the domestic currency against 
major foreign reserve currencies is likely to be downward. And the dollar, at least, has 
shown a safe-haven tendency to appreciate in global crises, which helps explain its 
attractiveness as a reserve asset (Gourinchas, Rey, and Govillot 2010).
7 
  Thus, central banks have gravitated toward the government liabilities of highly 
creditworthy countries – or other assets, such as U.S. agency securities, believed likely to 
come under the protection of a government guarantee. Such assets could include certain 
liabilities of systemically important financial institutions in the creditworthy advanced 
countries.  
So global reserve growth requires the ongoing issuance of gross government debt. 
This requires, in turn, that the government run continuing deficits, or that it issue debt to 
acquire assets likely to be inherently riskier than the corresponding liabilities. Just as in 
the classic Triffin dilemma, global reserve growth is largely driven by deficits – not 
national balance of payments deficits, but government deficits.
8  
                                                 
7 For alternative models of the dollar’s international role, see Canzoneri, Cumby, Diba, and López-Salido 
(2010) and Maggiori (2011). 
8 An analogous problem confronted Federal Reserve policymakers in 2000-01 as they contemplated the 
possibility of a disappearing U.S. federal debt. As Greenspan (2007, p. 214) puts it:   11
The additional dynamic element driving the modern-day dilemma is based on two 
asymmetries. First, the emerging and developing world is growing more quickly than the 
more credit-worthy industrial world. As Figure 3 shows, in 2009 the total GDP of the 
emerging and developing world (measured at PPP, and including newly-industrialized 
Asia) overtook that of the advanced economies, and the IMF predicts that the advanced 
economies will fall farther behind over time. The second asymmetry is that the main 
advanced countries remain more creditworthy on average than the poorer countries. The 
traditionally rich countries have been able to borrow more easily on world capital 
markets, and have therefore have had less need for international reserves than countries 
that are vulnerable to sudden stops.
9 Furthermore, they are less prone to undertake 
foreign exchange intervention, and have less capacity to sterilize. Together, these 
asymmetries imply that that the demand for rich-country government debt is likely to 
outstrip what can be supplied in the way of safe government debt without bringing the 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
My colleagues at the FOMC seemed a bit disoriented too.  In our late-January meeting, 
we spent hours trying to imagine how the Fed would operate in a brave new world of minimal 
federal debt.  Of course, shedding the debt burden would be a happy development for our country, 
but it would nevertheless pose a big dilemma for the Fed.  Our primary lever of monetary policy 
was buying and selling treasury securities -- Uncle Sam’s IOUs.  But as the debt was paid down, 
those securities would grow scarce, leaving the Fed in need of a new set of assets to effect 
monetary policy.  For nearly a year, senior Fed economists and traders had been exploring the 
issue of what other assets we might buy and sell.  
  A result was a dense 380-page study that plopped on our desks in January [of 2001].  The good 
news was that we weren’t going out of business; the bad news was that nothing could really match 
the treasuries market in size, liquidity, and freedom from risk.  To conduct monetary policy, the 
report concluded, the Fed would have to learn to manage a complex portfolio of municipal bonds, 
bonds issued by foreign governments, mortgage-backed securities, auctioned discount-window 
credits, and other debt instruments.  It was a daunting prospect.  “I feel kind of like Alice in 
Wonderland,” Cathy Minehan, the president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, had said 
when the issue first came up, and we all knew what she meant.  The very fact of the discussion 
showed how profoundly and rapidly we thought the economic landscape might change. 
 
Alas, “the economic landscape” did “profoundly and rapidly” change, but in a way that produced the worst 
of both worlds: huge U.S. deficits and debt, coupled with big holdings of exotic securities on the Fed’s 
balance sheet. 
9 Of course, recent sovereign debt problems in some of the richer countries show the strains on even 
advanced-country public finances following the 2007-09 crisis.   12
safety of that debt into question. Figure 4 gives a rough indication of the trend to date. 
How will the demand for reserves be satisfied if the richer countries actually succeed in 
the fiscal consolidation to which they currently aspire?
10  
A number of developments could head off this unstable dynamic, but might not 
come into effect soon enough. First, countries’ demand for reserves might level off, with 
some national wealth shunted into sovereign wealth funds willing to invest in riskier 
assets. To the extent that reserve demand is driven by the size of the financial system and 
the latter’s growth rate is high, however, strong reserve growth is likely to continue. 
Second, growth could decelerate in the emerging and developing world or accelerate in 
the currently rich countries. That development seems unlikely in view of the fiscal and 
other burdens that currently afflict much of the industrial world. Finally, some major and 
swiftly growing emerging markets could graduate in terms of their creditworthiness, 
reducing their demand for reserves and, potentially, making them suppliers of reserve 
assets. China (currently lacking a fully convertible currency) is the most likely candidate, 
but this very observation highlights the significant obstacles to such a development. Thus, 
the new incarnation of the Triffin dilemma is likely to bedevil the current system of 
international liquidity provision for some time, absent reforms. Danger signs are already 
appearing. As the sovereign debts of richer countries have come under pressure, it is no 
surprise to see the central banks of emerging economies increasing their gold purchases. 
                                                 
10 Figure 4 graphs general gross government debt growth in the U.S. and euro area against world nongold 
reserves. General government debt overstates the debt available for reserve growth, since central 
government debt is preferred. In addition, much euro zone central government debt would be viewed as 
riskier than, say, German debt lately, and therefore not ideal for reserve holders.   13
The problem is still mostly fiscal. But then, so are the broader questions 
concerning the adequacy of international liquidity in a world without a true outside 
reserve asset such as gold. I now turn to those questions. 
 
II. Reforming the Liquidity System 
 
The demise of generalized fixed exchange rates in 1973 allowed a solution to the open-
economy macroeconomic trilemma based on flexible exchange rates, domestic monetary 
autonomy, and financial-account liberalization (Obstfeld and Taylor 2004). The process 
started in the 1970s in the industrial countries. With a lag, and with considerable 
individual heterogeneity, the emerging market economies have started to follow down 
this path. Domestic financial liberalization has gone hand in hand with the process of 
external opening, with strong channels of two-way causation driving the overall freeing 
of finance, domestic and international alike. Whether and how this process will continue 
in light of the recent global crisis is a major open question. 
  The main trend raising the level of financial fragility in the world economy, 
and thereby liquidity needs, has been financial globalization, which has brought with it a 
rapid expansion of gross international asset positions. The latter expansion has been 
driven by a range of factors, including expanded risk sharing, financial deepening, and, 
less benignly, regulatory and tax arbitrage. At a point in time, a country’s net 
international investment position defines the gap that intertemporal solvency dictates 
between the present values of expenditure and income. But it is the nature of a country’s 
gross positions that determines its vulnerability to financial crisis – just as is the case for   14
individual economic actors. Moreover, given the current magnitude of gross external 
asset and liability positions, asymmetric valuation changes can easily imply changes in 
net assets that overwhelm the smaller flow increments due to the current account balance.  
  Figure 5 illustrates the trend in gross external assets for selected countries, 
plotting the ratio (Assets + Liabilities)/GDP through 2007 (with data from the update of 
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2007). Particularly for relatively open industrial countries that 
are also financial centers, the multiplication of gross external positions has been extreme. 
In such cases, a current account deficit may be a consequence of financial excess, being 
associated with a domestic credit boom, but it is not itself the prime locus of financial 
vulnerability. The main threat is that of a balance-sheet crisis. Thus, while Ireland had an 
external deficit in the run-up to the crisis, banks in surplus countries like Switzerland and 
Germany landed in trouble – dragging their governments along with them  – because of 
toxic foreign assets on their balance sheets. 
Figure 6 shows that for emerging and developing countries, gross acquisitions of 
claims on advanced countries, whether as reserves or as nonreserve (mainly private-
sector) claims, far exceed the net current account balance, a reflection of copious gross 
inflows from the industrial world. These flows are cumulating to economically significant 
shares of industrial country GDP: In 2007 alone, the annual flow amounted to 6 percent 
of industrial country GDP. The rapid GDP growth of the poorer countries is not matched 
by a commensurate importance in world financial markets, but the latter is certainly   15
growing, and doing so relative to the shrinking relative scale of the advanced 
economies.
11  
Through their growing gross asset positions, emerging and developing countries, 
especially the EMEs, are increasingly important players in financial globalization, and 
their financial stability is becoming increasingly tied to that of the global financial 
system. Yet they remain more vulnerable to sudden stops in foreign lending than are most 
of the advanced countries – notwithstanding the sudden emergence of sovereign debt 
problems in some of the latter. All the while, financial channels of contagious 
transmission have expanded along with gross positions. If policymakers wish to  
restructure the international liquidity system so as to enhance financial stability, these 
facts are central considerations.  
 
The Role of Global Last Resort Lending 
 
In the late 1970s, the United Kingdom, Italy, Spain, and Portugal all negotiated standby 
arrangements with the IMF.  Between Portugal’s last approach to the Fund in 1983 and 
Iceland’s in 2008, no industrial country requested Fund resources for balance of 
payments support – the Fund’s client base came to be viewed as consisting exclusively of 
developing and emerging economies. By the 1990s and 2000s, the high-income countries 
appeared to be quite creditworthy, unlikely ever to need Fund resources or even to need 
to use large volumes of international reserves. At the same time, the central banks of 
                                                 
11 The figure understates the trend, because the IMF definition of “advanced economies” includes Taiwan, 
Hong Kong, Korea, and Singapore. This labeling both reduces the IMF’s measures of emerging and 
developing country financial flows, and inflates its measure of advanced country GDP.   16
high-income countries were perceived to be well equipped, and willing, to act as last-
resort lenders if their home financial systems got into trouble.  
  Events after August 2007 have changed the picture, highlighting the more 
complex and in some respects more dangerous landscape that financial globalization has 
produced. Banks throughout the world, and especially in rich Europe, faced urgent needs 
for foreign-currency liquidity – liquidity that their home central banks could not create by 
the stroke of a pen (or click of a mouse). The result was the creation of a complex 
network of central bank swap lines, starting with the U.S. Federal Reserve’s lines to the 
ECB and SNB in December 2007.
12 Eventually that facility became unlimited in size. 
Furthermore, following Iceland’s collapse, the Greek, Irish, and Portuguese governments 
suffered funding crises that have been managed so far only with financial support from 
the EU, ECB, and IMF. Both Spain and Italy are on the verge of needing such external 
support as of this writing, and even France is under pressure. These advanced-country 
crises reflected various prior problems, such as garden-variety fiscal improvidence (the 
Greek scenario) and government bailout of a collapsed banking system (the primary 
culprit for Ireland). But in all cases, globalized financial markets fueled easier access to 
large volumes of foreign credit. Furthermore, globalization allowed the sovereign risks to 
spread through the European and global banking and shadow banking networks, in some 
cases increasing bailout risks and thereby weakening sovereigns further. 
What have we learned?  There are at least two major lessons. 
                                                 
12 The precedent for such arrangements is the network of reciprocal central bank credits set up in the early 
1960s at the urging of U.S. Treasury Secretary Douglas Dillon and Undersecretary for Monetary Affairs 
Robert Roosa. The Dillon-Roosa swaps, however, were intended to support foreign exchange intervention 
for purposes of maintaining  par values against the U.S. dollar. See Hirsch (1969, Chapter 11). 
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First, IMF facilities alone, even after being augmented in 2009, remain far below 
the magnitudes that rich countries with large public debts might need to fend of self-
fulfilling bond-market attacks. Furthermore, the speed and flexibility of IMF remains 
limited, given the openness of advanced countries to high-speed global financial markets. 
The large gross asset liability positions of the advanced countries – think of the external 
debts of Ireland, Iceland, or Switzerland, even though the last is a huge international 
creditor – have the potential to infect the government balance sheet, resulting in fiscal 
crisis. The assets of these countries’ banking systems are in a substantial number of cases 
substantial multiples of GDP. While the Irish crisis has been called a crisis of the euro 
zone – and adherence to a fixed exchange rate is indeed problematic for Ireland – the 
Irish crisis is even more a crisis of globalized finance. Even in cases where sovereign 
debt problems arise from garden-variety government profligacy, as in Greece, globalized 
finance promotes a potentially wide exposure of financial institutions to the problem, as 
noted earlier. 
Second, a key feature of a globalized multiple-currency world is that traditional 
lenders of last resort (the central banks) are ill equipped to support the needs of their 
swollen financial sectors, even when private-sector actors seek to maintain putative 
hedges on their foreign-currency exposure. For example, European banks in 2007 and 
2008 were big holders of U.S. mortgage-backed securities, these assets being funded by 
short-term dollar borrowing. Credit market disruptions sharply raised the cost of rolling 
over short-term dollar credits. At the same time, the costs of swapping euros for dollars to 
repay dollar credits rose far beyond what covered interest parity would imply. While the 
ECB, for example, could freely print euros and lend them to banks, its ability to supply   18
dollars out of reserves was much more limited (although some national central banks did 
so). The ECB itself could have borrowed dollars and intervened in spot and forward 
exchange markets, at the risk of quasi-fiscal costs – costs that would be higher today, 
now that the finances of even some larger euro zone governments are being questioned 
by the bond markets.  In the circumstances, it was much more expedient to be able to 
borrow dollars directly from the Fed, which in any case needed to expand its balance 
sheet to meet a heightened global demand for dollar liquidity.
13 Effectively, the Fed 
became an international last-resort lender in dollars – in the absence of which, European 
banks might have had to unload hard-to-sell assets, worsening fire-sale dynamics and 
weakening their own capital. Of course, the Fed also lent heavily, and directly, to the 
U.S. affiliates of foreign banks when they had eligible collateral. At the same time, other 
central banks – including the ECB, SNB, BOJ, Sveriges Riksbank – eventually stepped 
up as global last-resort lenders in their own currencies.  
As of the start of the global crisis in 2007, the usefulness of foreign-currency last-
resort lending to financial institutions was familiar from the EME experience – see 
Jeanne and Wyplosz (2003) and Calvo (2006) for insightful analyses. But it was less 
obviously a first-order issue for mature economies, where the main use of foreign 
exchange reserves (if any) was widely considered to be in cases of foreign exchange 
intervention.  The Fed has maintained swap facilities throughout the euro zone debt crisis 
starting in the spring of 2010. 
                                                 
13 The Fed was conveniently able to shift any credit risk of direct last-resort lending onto the ECB. On the 
background for the swap network and its effects, see, for example, McGuire and von Peter (2009), 
Goldberg, Kennedy, and Miu (2010), and Rose and Spiegel (2011). While controversy remains, most 
empirical researchers have concluded that the swap arrangements were effective in reducing credit market 
disruptions,   19
  The expansion of gross currency-denominated asset positions, given the 
inevitable gaps in global as well as domestic prudential oversight, suggests a demand for 
global lenders – to governments as well as central banks and, through them, to the private 
financial sector – that is greater than ever before.  
 
Self-Insurance through Reserve Accumulation 
 
Of course, growing financial vulnerability is part of the reason that the emerging and 
developing nations have accumulated high volumes of precautionary, hard-currency 
foreign exchange reserves – a trend I noted above, and which shows no sign of abating. 
Figure 7 illustrates that the resulting aggregate reserve stock, mostly U.S. dollars and 
euros, has now reached the neighborhood of one-third of the holders’ collective GDP, 
having risen from about 10 percent in 1990, when group GDP was much smaller than it is 
today. 
  This apparent security does not come without costs, both for individual reserve-
holding countries and for international monetary stability. For the holders, the great 
attraction of reserves is that they provide instantaneous and unconditional liquidity.  But 
even at the level of the individual holder, there are downsides: reserves may come at a 
high quasi-fiscal cost (costs also incurred if reserves should depreciate against domestic 
currency), and these costs may be incurred even if the marginal liquidity value of the 
reserves is illusory (because the process of reserve acquisition generated an equal short-
term private foreign-currency debt as an offsetting counterpart on the national balance 
sheet). Sterilization of reserve flows may lead to financial repression costs.   20
  Beyond these individual costs, however, national self-insurance through holdings 
of gross foreign reserves carries significant potential systemic costs. Reserve 
accumulation may influence interest rates in reserve centers – helping to fuel 
international resentments about “exorbitant privilege” that often fail to recognize the root 
of the problem in systemic congestion. Moreover, such interest-rate effects can 
complicate the task of monetary policy in the reserve-center country. Similarly, official 
portfolio shifts between different currencies, or between asset classes within currency 
areas (think of Chinese transactions in euro zone sovereign debt), alter exchange rates 
and bond prices, possibly in destabilizing ways.  
  Individual countries’ reserve gains may be strategic complements, in the sense 
that one country’s gains lower the relative perceived financial stability of its neighbors, in 
turn raising their marginal benefit from reserve accumulation. In that case, a non-
cooperative equilibrium will entail excessive accumulation by all. A further coordination 
problem arises when countries compete to keep their currencies weak and limit domestic 
demand, so as to generate current account surpluses.
14 Finally, in a global crisis, a 
country may exacerbate problems elsewhere when it draws on its reserves. For example, 
withdrawals of bank deposits in a foreign center may worsen liquidity problems there.  
  A final negative systemic externality is related to the modern-day Triffin dilemma 
of Farhi, Gourinchas, and Rey, which was described above. Each country’s purchase of 
more reserves may push other demanders into purchasing marginally riskier assets, or 
render their existing reserve holdings marginally more risky.  
                                                 
14 Note, however, that countries need not have current account surpluses to gain reserves if they can attract 
private financial inflows that exceed their current account deficits.   21
  The basic point is that actions that enhance the apparent financial resilience of the 
individual country may well, at the same time, undermine that of the international 
financial system as a whole. The fallacy of composition applies in the domain of 
international liquidity, just as it does in discussions of the macroprudential approach to 
domestic financial supervision. 
  Notwithstanding these drawbacks, emerging and developing economies are likely 
to continue accumulating reserves. And there is no doubt, despite the seeming ambiguity 
of formal econometric evidence, that these countries found reserves to be useful in the 
crisis.
15 Yet the crisis also illustrated systemic problems of reserve accumulation, as 
described earlier. Many countries were unwilling to run down their reserves sharply, 
precisely because smaller reserves might signal financial weakness compared with 
neighboring economies (see the related discussion of Aizenman and Sun 2009). Korea, 
for example, was reluctant to let its reserves to fall too low, and thus drew on its $30 
billion swap line from the Fed (which itself may have had an important signaling effect) 
despite substantially larger remaining reserve holdings.  
  To avoid losing too many reserves, EMEs found creative ways to stretch them. 
Several engaged in nonstandard foreign exchange operations, which effectively targeted 
specific financial vulnerabilities implied by private foreign exchange positions, while 
allowing the general demand for foreign exchange by relatively nonsystemic agents to go 
unsatisfied (see Ishi, Stone, and Yehoue 2009 and, on Brazil, Stone, Walker, and Yasui 
2009). For example, rather than injecting reserves generally into the market to counteract 
domestic capital flight and the resulting currency depreciation, some authorities provided 
foreign exchange at bargain rates to strategic banks and corporations with short-term 
                                                 
15 A recent study pointing to a positive role for reserves is Dominguez, Hashimoto, and Ito (2011).   22
foreign-currency debts. To return to the Korean example once again, the country was able 
to tolerate extensive won depreciation during the global crisis without the widespread 
financial distress characteristic of earlier crashes.
16 
 
The IMF and Global Liquidity 
 
In principle, a world central bank, as envisioned by Keynes in his original blueprint for 
an international “Clearing Union,” would be in a position to provide liquidity on a global 
basis to troubled financial institutions throughout the world – as well as directly to 
troubled sovereigns, were it not bound by statutory prohibitions against such lending, as 
the ECB is.  Indeed, there is no logical reason why a world central bank would be limited 
to the issuance and management of a single currency. In an ideal world, an omniscient 
and benevolent central bank could deal in a multiplicity of different national currencies, 
allowing exchange rates to float or managing them to whatever degree was optimal. From 
a political standpoint, of course, the idea is completely infeasible. 
The IMF is the version of Keynes’s ambitious plan that proved politically 
feasible, and its capacities, while quite useful and arguably essential (see Fischer 1999 
and Goodhart 1999), remain severely limited. Historically, the Fund has truly been the 
last resort for sovereigns, typically when it is too late to fend off a crisis, and subject to 
conditionality that sometimes strengthens a government’s hand against domestic 
opposition, but that also may contribute to political and social unrest. The Fund lends 
                                                 
16 The practice has an analog in the classic debate over whether lenders of last resort should lend into the 
market or directly to individual institutions. The collateral benefit of the latter approach in the case of 
foreign-currency operations is the benefit to exporters of a large depreciation. For conceptual discussions 
see Jeanne and Wyplosz (2003) and Calvo (2006).   23
exclusively to governments, and not directly to central banks or financial institutions, so 
as currently designed, it is completely unsuitable for undertaking the type of crisis 
lending to banks and other financial actors that proved so important during the global 
crisis. Nor can it mimic the ECB’s role in lending to euro zone banks during that 
currency area’s crisis. 
True, the Fund’s resources increased significantly in 2009. Its flexibility to lend 
them quickly based on ex ante qualification, and with relaxed conditionality, was 
extended through the Flexible and Precautionary Credit Lines. But the FCL and PCL 
have been little more successful than earlier related initiatives. Among other problems, 
countries seem to fear stigmatization, both from approaching the Fund to request a credit 
line and from the possibility that the IMF Executive Board fails to renew it down the 
road. Thus, the uptake on these facilities has been very limited: Mexico, Poland, and 
Colombia for the FCL, and only Macedonia for the PCL. In November 2011 the Fund 
announced replacement of the PCL by a new facility, the Precautionary and Liquidity 
Line (PLL), which extends the PCL in allowing a Fund member to apply for assistance 
even if it has an actual crisis at the time the line is approved (rather than just a potential 
crisis as the PCL required). 
One alternative proposal put forward by IMF staff is for a Global Stabilization 
Mechanism (GSM), which could allow the Fund to respond proactively with aid offers 
once a systemic event is identified by the Executive Board (see International Monetary 
Fund 2010). However, this approach remains controversial – as do related proposals for 
the domestic financial sphere that are based on a systemic trigger – and at this stage there 
are several versions of GSM on the table, the details of which differ considerably. None   24
seems likely to survive. An obvious problem area concerns the precise criteria under 
which the Fund would call a systemic event, and the response of markets in anticipation 
of such a declaration.  
A prominent mode through which the IMF can augment global liquidity is 
through the issuance of the Special Drawing Right (SDR).  But the SDR is not currently 
used for private transactions, and considerable obstacles impede development of a private 
SDR market (Eichengreen 2011). Notwithstanding the SDR’s non-currency status, some 
(for example, Zhou 2009) have argued for an international reserve system centered 
primarily on the SDR rather than the U.S. dollar. Such recent calls echo the Second 
Amendment to the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, which in 1978 set the ambitious goal of 
making the SDR the “principal reserve asset in the international monetary system.” 
The SDR was launched on January 1, 1970 after long international negotiations 
motivated by two main concerns. First, policymakers feared that U.S. balance of 
payments deficits might not, in the long run, provide sufficient international liquidity to 
meet the demands of a growing world economy. Second, policymakers feared that the 
dollar-based gold exchange standard would experience increasing instability because of 
the Triffin dilemma. The SDR, characterized at the time as “paper gold,” was designed as 
a limited form of unconditional liquidity, which governments could trade to other 
governments in exchange for hard-currency reserves.
17 
Until the recent big allocation of August and September 2009 following the onset 
of the global crisis, SDR allocations were infrequent, taking place only over 1970-72 and 
1979-81. None of these allocations, not even the most recent one, has pushed the total 
                                                 
17 For accounts of the thinking behind the SDR’s birth, and its early history, see Cumby (1983), Solomon 
(1996), and Boughton (2011).   25
stock of SDRs to be a large fraction of global foreign exchange reserves. Figure 8 
illustrates the numbers, based on data in the IMF’s International Financial Statistics. 
The stock of SDRs has never exceeded about 6 percent of global reserves, and 
that global figure declined steadily until 2009 following the 1979-81 allocation. On the 
eve of the crisis SDRs were less than 0.5 percent of global reserves, and an even smaller 
percentage of emerging and developing country reserves. In April 2009 the IMF allocated 
USD 250 billion worth of SDRs as a response to the global crisis, and a further USD 34 
billion in a September 2009 special allocation to endow members that had never received 
allocations. Except for such extraordinary allocations, SDR allocations are proportional 
to IMF quotas, so as to achieve an internationally balanced increase in world reserves. 
Thus, the bulk goes to the advanced economies (which also hold much lower stocks of 
foreign exchange reserves). Even the nominally large 2009 allocations restored the SDR 
share in global and poorer-country reserves only to the levels of the late 1980s (about 2 
percent for the latter group).  
The SDR framework is in principle a form of reserve pooling. Thus, the prospects 
of replacing actual reserve currencies such as the dollar and euro with SDRs are 
inherently limited: Because SDRs have no private use and function only as claims on the 
reserve pool, they cannot themselves supplant the reserve pool. 
18 
While the SDR therefore could not become the world’s principal reserve asset 
under current arrangements, proposals for a “substitution account” are designed to 
                                                 
18 As a technical matter, SDRs can be exchanged for dollars not only with non-U.S. dollar holders, but also 
with the U.S. Treasury, which obtains the dollars from the Fed in exchange for dollar-denominated 
Treasury obligations called SDR Certificates. (The Fed will routinely sterilize such money creation, and all 
currency risk resides with the Treasury.) However, it is unlikely that the Treasury and Fed would be willing 
to undertake such exchanges in the amounts that would be required were SDRs to become the dominant 
international reserve asset.    26
replace currency reserves with SDRs on a large scale. Such ideas were debated in 1979-
80, ultimately to no avail, but they have resurfaced recently (for example, Kenen 2010). 
Figure 8 shows that substitution would have to be on a huge scale to displace a 
substantial portion of currency reserves.  
Under a substitution scheme, a country such as China might transfer some of its 
dollar reserves to the IMF, receiving SDRs of equal current value in return. (These SDRs 
would have to be created outside the usual allocation process, of course.) Two portfolio 
shifts occur as a result. China is now long SDRS, and might (or might not) want to 
readjust its portfolio in private markets. Presumably, its degree of participation in the 
scheme will already reflect its diversification goals. More importantly, the IMF is short 
SDRs and long on U.S. dollars, and the substitution account’s solvency is at risk if the 
dollar depreciates. China has passed some of its substantial currency risk to the IMF. 
Which countries will compensate the IMF for portfolio losses if the dollar 
declines against the SDR? How will the IMF finance “exorbitant privilege” discrepancies 
between the interest earned on its dollars and that paid on its new SDR liabilities? In the 
last discussions of 1979-80, some countries involved thought the U.S. should bear the 
bulk of the costs, but the U.S. was unwilling and others refused to step in. Poorer 
countries were reluctant to see the IMF use its gold holdings to support the account – they 
hoped gold sales might instead subsidize borrowing by poorer countries. So the 
negotiations failed. It is unlikely that the U.S. would be more willing today, and even less 
so that the euro zone countries – which lack a centralized fiscal organ – would be willing 
to underwrite a euro/SDR substitution account.    27
Once again, the fiscal dimension is central. The absence of a fiscal authority at the 
global level creates a difficult coordination problem for a centralized and coordinated 
move to an SDR-based system, even though that system might confer some stability 
advantages (for example, by discouraging large official portfolio shifts).
19   
 
Globalized Last-Resort Lending 
 
The IMF’s traditional function of lending to sovereign governments leaves it ill equipped 
for the more direct financial-market interventions traditionally associated with domestic 
lenders of last resort. Even the newer more flexible lending facilities, which could 
channel the needed resources through governments in principle, are likely to involve time 
delays and informational frictions. Furthermore, the known quantitative limits of such 
facilities can be an obstacle to reassuring markets that the authorities are capable of 
intervening with overwhelming force. It is no accident that the Federal Reserve found it 
useful to remove the quantitative limits on some of its swap lines as the 2007-09 crisis 
unfolded. 
  A different approach would institutionalize the network of swap lines between 
central banks that arose in an ad hoc way during the 2007-09 crisis Operationally, 
national central banks could  extend the swap lines to a central international institution 
such as the IMF or (as some central bankers might prefer) the Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS). Other central banks, when in need of foreign currency to support 
stressed financial sectors, would then be able to draw on the swaps, just as the ECB 
obtained dollars from the Fed under the recent arrangements. Such a system could be 
                                                 
19 For an account of the 1979-80 negotiations over a substitution account, see Boughton (2001, pp. 936-43).    28
based on the SDR, though it need not be. Truman (2008, 2010) has proposed modifying 
existing rules to allow countries directly to present SDRs to central banks in return for the 
currencies the banks issue. Obstfeld (2009) and Farhi, Gourinchas, and Rey (2011) 
suggest systems based on explicit credit lines.  
  Unlike the recent improvised swap network, a permanent system would be 
predictable rather than ad hoc and all countries, not just a select few, would have access. 
But the system would avoid the externalities inherent in large-scale self-insurance 
through reserve accumulation. For example, there would be no scope for official switches 
between reserve currencies in order to manage currency risk. Nor would reserve demands 
depress the interest rates of reserve issuers. 
  The terms of access to the credit network could be conditional. For example, 
participating central banks might be required to satisfy criteria of independence and 
supervisory diligence. A variable participation fee might cover potential financial losses, 
in analogy to the charge Prasad (2011) has suggested for his proposed liquidity insurance 
pool. The fee could be structured so as to encourage sound macroeconomic and financial 
policies – for example, rising in the face of an unusual and apparently unjustified credit 
boom. Staff from the IMF, the BIS, or even from participating central banks could be 
deployed to carry out the necessary surveillance. Credit limits might also be structured so 
as to alter incentives. 
  Both graduated participation terms and international surveillance offer partial 
brakes on moral hazard – the risk that expanded liquidity facilities encourage key actors 
in the financial system to behave more imprudently than they would in the absence of a   29
safety net. But moral hazard could be limited further by complementary reforms that 
target government incentives. 
  There are two main ways in which enhanced international liquidity could 
encourage governments toward actions with negative global externalities: by promoting 
excessive fiscal deficits (even outside of currency unions) and lax prudential oversight of 
domestic private-sector finance. Governments would be better motivated to limit deficits 
if any swap network participation fee depended on fiscal variables, as in Prasad’s (2011) 
proposal. But more generally, and regardless of the state of international liquidity 
arrangements, predictable means of restructuring sovereign debts, even the debts of 
mature economies, can push private incentives into better alignment with society’s 
interests.  Such mechanisms can limit excessive government borrowing through rising 
marginal costs, but, as Charles Goodhart stresses in his chapter, they also may improve 
the incentives of the creditor-country governments whose financial institutions may be 
bankrolling profligate governments (as well as those of the institutions themselves).  
  If governments wish for institutionalized sovereign restructuring mechanisms 
to be credible, however, they should complement them with limits on the banking 
sector’s unhedged exposure to risky sovereign debts. Such limits remain difficult to 
conceive in the euro zone in the absence of a common “safe” euro area bond, simply 
because of the big role sovereign bonds play as collateral. 
  Mandatory subscription to a set of common regulatory standards and 
procedures would serve to limit individual governments’ discretion in prudential 
oversight. These norms would more effectively limit private-sector risk seeking if they 
encompassed guidelines on institutional size – so as to mitigate the “too big to fail”   30
problem – as well as predictable and credible resolution procedures for systemically 
important financial institutions, including resolutions involving multiple governments. As 
noted above, implementation of these undertakings could be subject to international 
surveillance, with transgressions resulting in higher participation fees. 
  A general lesson of recent experience is that a system for counteracting 
illiquidity needs to account for the possibility that the underlying cause of market panic is 
insolvency. There is no uniquely defined dividing line between the two – in no small part 
because market perceptions are a key driver of borrowing costs and, thus, of the ability to 
service debt – but there will clearly be cases in which state or institutional bankruptcy 
becomes inevitable.  
  The possibility of insolvencies raises the potential fiscal cost any international 
arrangements to enhance global liquidity.  As Goodhart (1999) has stressed, the backing 
for the lender of last resort in cases of insolvency comes from the fiscal authorities. Thus, 
as has been painfully evident during the euro zone’s debt crisis, collective action to 
promote financial stability must be financed through collective action in the fiscal 
sphere.
20 Unfortunately, in today’s world of huge banking sectors there also can come a 
point at which insolvency problems become so big that they bring the creditworthiness 
even of governments into question – at which point it may well be that the only 




                                                 
20 See the further discussion in Obstfeld (2011).   31
III. Exchange Rates and Global Imbalances 
 
The final demise of the Bretton Woods system in 1973 took the form of a disorderly 
retreat to floating exchange rates among the main industrial countries. Despite the 
unplanned and indeed initially unintended nature of the regime change, a number of 
eminent economists such as Milton Friedman and Harry G. Johnson had long espoused 
floating rates as a means of reconciling national policy sovereignty with the benefits of 
global economic integration. To a considerable degree floating exchange rates have been 
successful, which explains why, in this century, even a growing number of EMEs have 
been opting for greater exchange rate flexibility. Yet, most of the Friedman-Johnson 
claims have not been borne out fully, and it is increasingly clear that floating rate have 
left ample room for politically contentious spillovers in economic policy. 
  Predictions that floating rates would remove the need for international liquidity 
have clearly proven wrong, and the earlier part of this chapter discussed the reasons why. 
As a group, the EMEs conducted massive foreign reserve accumulation even as many of 
them were moving to more flexible exchange rate regimes. 
  Also problematic, in light of experience, have been the claims that floating or 
flexible exchange rates would painlessly facilitate the adjustment to real (output-market) 
shocks or ensure the rapid adjustment of current account imbalances. Most 
fundamentally, two countries share every bilateral exchange rate, and there is no 
guarantee in general that both will take the same view of its optimal level. Due to 
asymmetries in economic structure, the difficulties of adjusting to exchange rate changes 
have proven greater for emerging and developing countries, igniting talk of “currency   32
wars” and renewed policy attention to capital controls as a means of exchange-rate 
management. 
 
Exchange Rates, Resource Allocation, and Coordination in the Short Run 
 
Sharp exchange rate movements driven by financial-market changes can have unwelcome 
effects on resource allocation, effects that are especially painful for poorer countries. 
These effects lead to “fear of floating” behavior in the mode of Calvo and Reinhart 
(2002), and lie behind the recent attacks of some EME governments on the Federal 
Reserve’s accommodative monetary response to recession. 
  Figure 9 illustrates a configuration typical of many EMEs in the post-crisis 
period. Assume that domestic nominal wages and nontraded goods prices are sticky, 
whereas traded goods’ prices show a full pass-through to the exchange rate. Assume also 
that traded goods are priced in world markets, and that the tradables sector is competitive. 
Finally, imagine that capital and labor are sector-specific in the short run, that is, unable 
to migrate between traded and nontraded goods industries.  
  In the figure, the downward-sloping locus NN shows combinations of the 
nominal exchange rate E (price of foreign currency) and total domestic spending Z such 
that labor in the nontradable sector is fully (but not overly) employed. (A rise in Z at a 
constant exchange rate would cause excess demand for nontradables, but currency 
appreciation lowers tradables prices and shifts demand toward the latter goods.) The 
horizontal schedule TT gives the exchange rate at which, given nominal wages, the 
tradable sector’s labor supply is fully employed. The upward-sloping schedule XX shows   33
combinations of spending and the exchange rate at which the current account is in 
balance (however defined).  
  The economy is initially at point A, with output above potential in nontradables 
and a current account surplus. Because product wages are low in tradables, output is also 
above potential there. There is upward cost pressure in both sectors and upward price 
pressure in nontradables. 
  Consider the impact, at a constant spending level, of a sharp nominal 
appreciation that moves the economy to point B. Perhaps a large foreign country has 
loosened monetary policy; perhaps markets are looking forward to and speculating on 
tighter domestic monetary policy. In either case, output falls in both sectors and the 
tradables sector experiences a particularly sharp decline in capital income. In the case 
shown, inflationary pressures subside but at the cost of underemployment in both sectors. 
The current account surplus shrinks as the economy moves closer to XX.  
  These impacts are painful, so much so that many EMEs in positions like point 
A have preferred to resist appreciation, accumulating substantial additional foreign 
reserves in the process and sterilizing them in an attempt to avoid feeding domestic 
inflation. Figure 10 illustrates the experience of a sample of EMEs with respect to real 
appreciation (bilateral, against the U.S. dollar) and reserve accumulation in 2010. As 
exchange market pressure rises, countries generally have allowed more appreciation but 
also have intervened more heavily, and in some cases massively. 
  When EMEs as a group face an expansionary global monetary shock 
emanating from the industrial countries, the result is a coordination failure reminiscent of 
the competitive depreciation of old – or at least, it is competitive nonappreciation. But   34
unlike the currency competition of the Great Depression, more recent rounds have been 
adding fuel to inflationary fires. The problem has gained quantitative importance through 
the growth of intra-EME trade. How does the coordination failure come about?  
  The Chinese yuan’s relative weakness against the U.S. dollar, for example, 
makes Brazil even less willing to appreciate the real (and vice versa); so both countries 
intervene more, and accumulate more dollar reserve claims, the latter being feasible in 
unlimited amounts. To the extent that sterilization is imperfect, the latter process fuels 
asset-price appreciation and inflation, in a manner reminiscent of the Bretton Woods 
system’s collapse in the early 1970s. (Figure 1 showed the explosive growth in foreign 
exchange reserves during those few years.)   
  The problem can conveniently be formalized as a Prisoner’s Dilemma in a 
stylized world with three currencies, the real (R), yuan (Y), and U.S. dollar (U).
21 If α is 
the share of intra-EME trade, then using triangular arbitrage in the foreign exchange 
market we may express the (log) nominal effective exchange rates of the real and yuan in 
terms of bilateral nominal exchange rates as: 
 
  The payoffs in the game are determined as follows. Both countries face 
medium-term inflationary pressures, which do not affect the price level adjusted 
exchange rate in the short run but are counted as costs with present value –0.9 in both 
                                                 
21 In a related strategic analysis, Ogawa and Ito (2002) analyze the interdependence of two neighboring 















countries. Figure 11 shows the game between Brazil and China in normal form, and it 
includes the information (upper left corner) that if both countries fix to the U.S. dollar, 
the payoffs are –0.9 for Brazil (first entry) and –0.9 for China (second entry). I will 
assume that if a country appreciates by 1 payoff unit, its payoff from that action is the 
change in the (log) nominal effective exchange rate (given by the equations above), but 
domestic inflation pressures are eliminated. Thus, in the lower left corner of the payoff 
matrix, where Brazil appreciates but China continues to peg the yuan, Brazil pays an 
effective appreciation cost of –1 (as the cost of future inflation drops to 0) but China pays 
a cost of only  –(0.9–α), since its inflation cost (equal to –0.9) is partially offset by an 
effective nominal depreciation due to the real’s nominal appreciation against the dollar (a 
gain equal to α as a result of the rise in e$/R by 1 unit). Critical to the example, of course, 
is my assumption that policymakers view appreciation today as being more costly than 
inflation tomorrow. 
  Assuming further that α > 0.1, we see that the efficient solution is for both 
countries to appreciate jointly against the dollar, thereby reducing their losses from 
inflation as shown in the lower right corner of Figure 11. But this is not a Nash 
equilibrium: each country has an incentive to defect so as to free ride on the other’s 
appreciation. The sole Nash equilibrium – the noncooperative solution – is where both 
countries fix to the dollar and suffer inflation later as a result. 
  Notice that EMEs lose no matter what (in this simplified game). But even if 
there is nothing they can do to change U.S. monetary policy, they can limit their losses 
more effectively if they can coordinate amongst each other. The gains to cooperation are 
greater the greater is the extent of intra-EME trade (or competition in third markets), as   36
roughly measured by α in the example above. As a coordination mechanism, the IMF 
could deploy its staff’s analytical firepower so as to quantify and advertise the 
availability to such cooperation gains among EMEs. If policymakers want the Fund to be 
more effective in promoting global cooperation, they should encourage it to provide very 
concrete illustrations of the gains such cooperation would provide for individual member 
countries. The Fund is ideally positioned to explain how the pieces of the global economy 
fit together. 
  The costs of allowing currency appreciation (and larger currency fluctuations 
in general) appear somewhat lower for the mature industrial economies (with Japan a 
possible exception). These economies have larger domestic markets for their tradable 
goods and more ability to price to market so as to cushion exchange-rate effects on 
domestic prices.  
 
Capital Inflow Controls 
 
In the example just discussed, countries face a tradeoff: appreciation would lower 
domestic inflation pressure, but at the cost of lower employment. Domestic monetary 
tightening would dampen inflation, but at the cost of even sharper currency appreciation. 
This is a classic instance of the trilemma.  
  Some EMEs have turned increasingly to capital inflow controls as a way out, 
with apparently limited success. (For the moment no mature economy – not even the 
ultimate safe haven, Switzerland – appears likely to embrace controls, although 
Switzerland has placed a ceiling on its franc’s value.) The IMF has moved increasingly to   37
acceptance that capital inflow controls are a legitimate policy tool in some circumstances, 
turning from what once was fairly monolithic opposition to discussions of the appropriate 
use of controls (see Ostry and others, 2010, 2011).  
  In principle there are two (often correlated in practice but conceptually 
distinct) motivations for inflow controls. First, there is the macroeconomic motivation of 
reducing exchange market pressure in the form of the volume of capital inflows – 
basically, escape from the trilemma. Second, there is the macroprudential motivation, 
which certainly includes changing the composition of capital flows but might also target 
the volume if the capacity of the financial sector safely to intermediate funds is limited. 
Available evidence suggests that controls have been more successful in influencing the 
composition of flows – for example, inducing a lengthening of debt maturities (Chile) or 
a shift from external debt to equity (India) – than in moderating volumes or real 
appreciation pressures.
22  
  From a macroprudential standpoint, however, capital inflow controls would 
often appear to be a second-best tool, the first best being a response that more directly 
targets the relevant financial distortion. For example, a country concerned about banks’ 
currency mismatch should restrict or tax all foreign-currency liabilities, not just those 
contracted with nonresidents. In theory, however, one can certainly devise cases in which 
the optimal feasible policy intervention, from a nationalistic or even global welfare 
standpoint (Korinek 2011), is to tax foreign borrowing or debt.
23 Ostry and others (2011) 
suggest that capital inflow controls be deployed in preference to macroprudential 
                                                 
22 See Magud, Reinhart, and Rogoff (2011) for a recent survey. 
23 I would conjecture that in cases where global rather than just national efficiency is impaired, the second-
best intervention could involve not only taxation of capital inflows, but also taxation of outflows on the part 
of source countries. If true, this result would furnish a formal case for symmetric adjustment on the part of 
lending and borrowing countries (see below).   38
instruments mainly when financial inflows enter the economy through nonbank entities 
such as large nonfinancial corporations. Some countries, of course, have used putative 
macroprudential tools in attempts to escape the constraints of the trilemma.   
  If capital inflow controls were to become generally accepted as part of the 
policy toolkit, however, transparency would be enhanced if the international community 
were to develop guidelines as to which instruments are admissible and the circumstances 
in which they will be used. A regime based on rules, rather than discretion, seems more 
likely to enhance predictability and thereby avoid financial-market volatility. It should 
also be recognized that inflow controls entail possible negative international spillovers. A 
country imposing them unilaterally may simply divert financial inflows to neighboring 
economies. Capital inflow controls, as in China’s case, give a country more latitude to 
maintain an artificially competitive exchange rate and thereby contribute to larger global 
imbalances. Thus, if policymakers wish to reduce global externalities from the use of 
controls, internationally coordinated surveillance, most plausibly conducted by the IMF, 




Current account imbalances have not become smaller and less persistent in the era of 
floating exchange rates. Instead, increasing financial capital mobility (in part supported 
by floating rates, as suggested by Obstfeld and Taylor 2004) has eased the financing of 
deficits and allowed easier disposition of excess national savings. Moreover, the “long 
run” in which the real exchange rate should reflect the requirement of external balance   39
has become considerably more distant.  (Figure 12 shows the aggregates of measured 
world current account surpluses and deficits after 1980, which both peaked at about 3 
percent of world output just before the crisis broke in 2006.) The time-honored problem 
of asymmetric adjustment pressure on surplus and deficit countries remains as intractable 
as ever, as Charles Goodhart emphasizes in his chapter. 
  In the mid-2000s, Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and Garber (2008, 2009) advanced 
a “Bretton Woods II” paradigm according to which the big global imbalances of the 
period, driven in part by the Chinese authorities’ desire and capacity to industrialize on 
the back of exports, might be sustainable for a decade or more. That hypothesis led to a 
lively debate. For examples of the critiques see Roubini (2006), Obstfeld and Rogoff 
(2007), Wolf (2008), and Hall and Tavlas (2011). 
  The global imbalance configuration of the mid-2000s appears in retrospect to 
have been problematic, which should not be too surprising because it bears a resemblance 
to several other episodes that ended in tears (and perhaps also to the current configuration 
of imbalances). Asia in general (outside of Japan) was growing at a rate exceeding that of 
the mature economies, with China in particular pursuing a “vent for surplus” growth 
model (Caves 1965).
24 Several mature economies, but most notably the United States, 
were absorbing Asian exports through growing consumption and indebtedness (not 
through growing productive investment, much of which was taking place anyway in 
residential housing).  
  While a soft landing is theoretically possible in this scenario, the rapid increase 
in U.S. household debt that made America the world’s spending locomotive relied on the 
                                                 
24 There are analogies in the early postwar experiences in Western Europe and Japan. On Europe, see 
Kindleberger (1967).    40
collateral of rising and inflated home values, which were bound to collapse and did 
starting in 2006.  Given actual and prospective U.S. income growth in the middle 2000s, 
there was no way that China could maintain its own more rapid export-led growth for 
much longer on the back of growing U.S. household debt, without U.S. households 
becoming insolvent. The virulence of the resulting financial meltdown, of course, 
reflected the gross positions that financial actors in the U.S. and Europe had unwisely 
assumed prior to the start of the U.S. housing collapse. 
  In analyzing potential perils due to global imbalances, it is once again 
important to ask how the pieces fit together. When large surplus countries grow more 
rapidly than deficit countries, consumption growth in the latter is necessarily increasing 
faster than income, a process that is very likely to end in crisis unless the debtor’s income 
growth catches up. Indeed, just this problem underlies the sovereign debt crisis within the 
euro zone; see the insightful analysis by Giavazzi and Spaventa (2010). Similarly, the 
current account deficit of the U.S. in the early 2010s, while diminished compared to 
2006, is underpinned by large fiscal deficits that are unsustainable over the longer term.  
  In such situations, a main brake on the behavior of surplus countries is the fear 
that the assets they are accumulating (whether held by the public sector – Chinese dollar 
reserves – or the private sector – German banks’ holdings of Greek sovereign debt) might 
be devalued. (Another is the threat of protection.) If policymakers wish international 
lenders to be cognizant of risks they are running, then it is important that the international 
financial system be structured so as to make such fears rational, as Goodhart stresses in 
his chapter.
25 But we should not expect such a system substantially to reduce the 
                                                 
25 Keynes (1924) may have been the first to observe that the risk of default on foreign investments might 
render their level excessive from a purely nationalistic perspective. The fact that nowadays, default losses   41
adjustment burdens of deficit countries, which will still suffer more tightly constrained or 
more expensive credit as they appear riskier. 
  The IMF has the standing to speak out when, in its view, large and persistent 
external imbalances threaten to result in a solvency crisis, whether in the public or private 
sectors.  The IMF also is in a position to urge cooperative policy scenarios that can make 
the process of reducing global imbalances easier for all participants. If policymakers wish 
to raise the weight of the IMF’s advice in the international community, they should 
support reforms of IMF governance that make such pronouncements politically feasible 
and credible regardless of the countries involved. 
   A system of liquidity credit lines, as described in the last section, could 
discourage precautionary reserve accumulation, although the latter can occur even in the 
absence of current account surpluses.
26 Proposals to formally tax large reserve holders, 
either in an SDR-based reserve system or one based on currencies, are unlikely to gain 




Problems of international liquidity and exchange rate management – staple fare in the 
international monetary reform literature over many decades – remain painfully relevant 
today, but in forms that sometimes differ from past incarnations. At bottom, many of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
may imperil entire domestic financial systems greatly reinforces Keynes’s insight. Subsequent literature has 
reiterated the point (for example, Kemp 1962 and Krugman and Obstfeld 1988, p. 504) but perhaps not 
often enough. In today’s world of large two-way capital flows, which may be highly unbalanced between 
bilateral partners even when overall current account imbalances are small, one must recognize that the issue 
really concerns gross rather than net international investment flows per se. In practice, however, current 
account surplus countries can reduce their exposure over time by reducing their surpluses.  
26 Recall the much discussed “capital inflows problem” of disinflating developing countries. See Borio and 
Disyatat (2011) for a reminder on the potential decoupling of the current account and balance of payments.   42
coordination problems that arise stem from asymmetries in the structures, growth rates, 
and cyclical positions of the mature economies and the developing world. These two 
segments of the global economy are fast approaching (and on some measures have 
reached) equal size, as measured by real GDP. 
  Many years ago, Richard Cooper (1969, p. 600) drew an intriguing connection 
between the extent of policy cooperation over macroeconomic policies and the need for 
international liquidity. I believe that his point remains valid: 
 
The degree of … international cooperation … influences the amount of liquidity 
needed to finance imbalances in the face of temporarily divergent and conflicting 
national policies. The more cooperation, the more carefully coordinated national 




  I have argued that, in addition, there is considerable scope for a cooperative 
approach to global liquidity provision today.  A collateral benefit of such cooperation is 
that it can mitigate other coordination failures in national economic policies. 
Unfortunately, these continue to cause tensions between governments, and there are no 
easy solutions in a world of sovereign nations.  
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Figure 1: Gold reserves and nongold reserves held by non-US 
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Figure 3: Output shares of advanced and 
emerging/developing economies (at PPP)





















































































































































































































Figure 6: Gross asset accumulation and current accounts of 
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Figure 8: SDR holdings as a fraction of total international reserves: 
Advanced countries, emerging/developing countries, and world





























































































































































Source: IMF, WEO database, April 2011
A
g
g
r
e
g
a
t
e
 
c
u
r
r
e
n
t
 
a
c
c
o
u
n
t
 
s
u
r
p
l
u
s
e
s
 
a
n
d
 
d
e
f
i
c
i
t
s
 
a
s
 
a
 
f
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
w
o
r
l
d
 
G
D
P
Surplus Deficit
 
 
 